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Accountable Care Organizations in the
Affordable Care Act
*

Frank Pasquale
I.

INTRODUCTION

On March 23, 2010, Section 3022 of the Patient Protection &
Affordable Care Act (PPACA or ACA) established the Medicare
Shared Savings Program (MSSP).
The MSSP depends on
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) to coordinate care for large
groups of Medicare beneficiaries and reduce their overall costs while
1
maintaining quality. ACOs are a critical part of the PPACA. If they
succeed, they could be a model of care coordination critical to cost
reductions, quality improvements, and expanded access to care both
2
within and beyond the Medicare program. Their failure would not
bode well for the wide array of pilot programs promoted and funded
3
by the PPACA.
Seton Hall was the first law school to host a conference on

*

Schering-Plough Professor of Health Care Finance and Regulation, Seton Hall
Law School. I would like to thank Gianna Cricco-Lizza, Temi Kolarova, and other
members of the Law Review for their excellent work on the symposium. Professors
John Jacobi and Kathleen Boozang were also invaluable to planning the event.
Deans Rosa Alves-Ferreira and Denise Pinney also offered invaluable contributions to
our planning and organization.
1
Jenny Gold, FAQ On ACOs: Accountable Care Organizations, Explained, KAISER
HEALTH NETWORK (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2011
/January/13/ACO-accountable-care-organization-FAQ.aspx.
2
Maulik Joshi, American Hospital Association, Accountable Care Organizations
AHA Research Synthesis Report, American Hospital Association Committee on
Research, (June 2010), available at http://www.hret.org/accountable/resources
/ACO-Synthesis-Report.pdf; Accountable Care Organizations (ACO): What’s an ACO?,
CTRS.
FOR
MEDICARE
&
MEDICAID
SERVS.,
(Apr.
5,
2010),
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-ServicePayment/ACO/index.html.
3
For a discussion of pilot programs’ importance to health care, see Frank
Pasquale, Ending the Specialty Hospital Wars: A Plea for Pilot Programs as InformationForcing Regulatory Design, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND
SOLUTIONS (Einer Elhauge, ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2010). For an accessible account
of the role of pilot programs in PPACA, see Atul Gawande, Testing, Testing, THE NEW
YORKER, Dec. 14, 2009, at 34, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009
/12/14/091214fa_fact_gawande.
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ACOs. We planned the conference in early 2011, as excitement
about ACOs was building in much of the policy community.
Moreover, we felt that whatever happened to the ACA in the
Supreme Court, the organizational forms suggested by the PPACA
regarding ACOs were influencing private sector players. Providers,
insurers, and employers were increasingly coordinating to deal with
cost and quality concerns.
On March 31, 2011, the proposed rule guiding providers on the
4
establishment of ACOs was released. The negative industry response
was nearly immediate: providers felt that they were being asked to
move too fast and aggressively on a wide variety of initiatives. For
example, merely developing IT systems to keep track of the sixty-five
quality performance standards needed to qualify for shared savings
payments seemed daunting. Keeping up with the “meaningful use”
rulemakings guiding American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009 (ARRA) subsidies for electronic health records (EHRs) was hard
enough; now a whole other program was affecting recordkeeping.
While federal policymakers had assumed there would be synergies
between ACO establishment and a larger health information
5
technology (HIT) revolution, providers felt they were being asked to
do too much, too soon. Industry resistance left us wondering if the
conference might be rendered irrelevant due to lack of provider
interest in establishing ACOs. The MSSP is an incentive program,
not a mandate: the private sector must choose to participate if it is to
be effective.
We should not have worried. The idea of accountable care
proved attractive to private insurers, regardless of its fate at the
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). And by the time
of the conference, the regulatory treatment of ACOs had bent toward
4

Jordan Rau, Phil Galewitz & Bara Vaida, New ACO Rules Outline Gains And Risks
HEALTH
NEWS
(Mar.
31,
2011),
For
Doctors,
Hospitals,
KAISER
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2011/March/31/ACO-rules.aspx;
U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FACT SHEET: ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS:
IMPROVING CARE COORDINATION FOR PEOPLE WITH MEDICARE (Mar. 31, 2011), available
at http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/~/media/Files/2011/HHS%20ACO
%20Overview%20Fact%20Sheet%2033111.pdf; CMS OFFICE OF MEDIA AFF., FACT
SHEET: SUMMARY OF PROPOSED RULE PROVISIONS FOR ACCOUNTABLE CARE
ORGANIZATIONS UNDER THE MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM (Mar. 31, 2011),
available at http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/~/media/Files/2011/CMS%20ACO
%20Fact%20Sheet%20%20Summary%20Proposed%20Rule%20110331.pdf.
5
See, e.g., Bob Spoerl, 6 Steps to Building an ACO’s Health IT Capacity, BECKER’S
HOSP. REV., June 15, 2012, available at http://www.beckershospitalreview.com
/hospital-physician-relationships/6-steps-to-building-an-acos-health-it-capability.html.
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provider demands. Hospitals and doctors successfully demanded key
changes to the regulatory template. Industry, HHS, and CMS were
6
soon singing from the same hymnal. The final rule only imposed
thirty-three quality measures, and gave other concessions to those
forming ACOs. By the time our conference occurred on October, 28,
2011, ACOs were again a buzzword in health policy, both as specific
description related to the MSSP and as a larger catchall term for
trends in health care organization and finance.
The pas de deux between business and government over ACOs
7
had a larger significance for administrative law scholarship. From
the time of its passage in 2010 to the climactic Supreme Court ruling
in NFIB v. Sebelius, prominent attacks on PPACA have come almost
entirely from the right on the political spectrum. The rhetoric of the
“constitution in exile” succeeded both in empowering states to resist
the ACA’s Medicaid expansion and influencing the Commerce
8
Clause jurisprudence of the Court. But the individual mandate
survived, as Congress’s power to tax prevented the four justices in the
joint dissent from using nonseverability doctrine to sweep the ACA
from American law forever.
Now that the ACA is to be implemented in earnest, we should
expect to hear more critiques of it from the left. Focused on the
ethics and effectiveness of leading providers and insurers, these are
the critiques most relevant to ACOs. For ACOs to work, many large
corporate enterprises will need to delicately balance the interests of

6

Mark McClellan (George W. Bush’s CMS Director) and Elliott Fisher sang its
praises in Health Affairs. See Mark McClellan and Elliott Fisher, The ACO Final Rule:
Progress Toward Better Care At Lower Cost, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 21, 2011),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2011/10/21/the-aco-final-rule-progress-toward-bettercare-at-lower-cost/; Mark McClellan, Aaron N. McKethan, Julie L. Lewis, Joachim
Roski & Elliott S. Fisher, A National Strategy To Put Accountable Care Into Practice, 29(5)
HEALTH AFF. 982 (2010).
7
The relative power of business and government in common collaborations has
been a frequent topic of inquiry, particularly in agencies regulating competition.
The competing imperatives of recognizing business needs, while avoiding corporatist
overidentification of state and corporate interests, are a recurring theme in
administrative law. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Indecopi as Brand and Holding Company:
The Business Model of Governance, in THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN COMPETITION AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA: TOWARDS AN ACADEMIC AUDIT OF
INDECOPI 91 (Beatriz Boza, ed., 2000) (describing the tensions in a competition law
regulator).
8
The anti-ACA decision became a staple of conservative jurisprudence despite
challenging what many commentators believed to be settled law. See Mark A. Hall,
Judge Vinson’s Tea Party Manifesto, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Jan. 31, 2011),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/01/judge-vinsons-tea-partymanifesto.html.
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9

patients and service providers. Will they truly maintain quality, or
game indicators of quality? Will cost-savings come at the expense of
patient care? Where are the real opportunities to improve outcomes,
10
and what is mere gaming?
Responsive regulation will need to
answer all these questions, and many more, as ACO implementation
continues.
This introductory essay describes the academic and regulatory
agenda for ACOs, and the way our conference authors clarified it.
Part II describes the rationale of the ACA in general and the ACO
program in particular. Part III explains the left critique of the ACA,
and how the ACO program provides a good test case for whether the
ACA’s model of corporate-government cooperation can actually
improve outcomes and reduce costs. Part IV summarizes the
positions of our conference speakers. Part V concludes.
II. ACOS IN THE ACA
Critics of the ACA have frequently complained that the
legislation does not do enough to improve quality or to cut costs.
However, the Act did create incentives for ACOs to challenge
traditional health care regulatory models. Elliott Fisher, director of
the Center for Health Policy Research at Dartmouth Medical School,
describes the “three key attributes” of ACOs: “organized care,
11
performance measurement, and payment reform.”
Fisher has argued that insurers are not well-positioned to
improve the quality of health care because they “have largely focused
on negotiating favorable prices within relatively open networks of
providers” instead of trying to improve the health care their members
12
received. He believes that a “virtual network” of physicians could do
a better job, if they teamed up with hospitals. An “accountable care

9

See Robert Pear, Consumer Risks Feared as Health Law Spurs Mergers, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/health/policy/21health.html.
10
David Whelan, How Cherry Picking Could Hurt Obama’s Health Care Plan, FORBES,
July 13, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0713/health-obama-insurancehmo-cherry-picking.html (discussing possibilities for gaming the system).
11
Elliott S. Fisher et al., Creating Accountable Care Organizations: The Extended
Hospital Medical Staff, 26(1) HEALTH AFF. w44 (2007), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/26/1/w44.full.
12
Id. Private insurers have little incentive to keep current subscribers healthy
over the long term, since at least half of subscribers on average churn into different
plans within three years of signing up with a given plan. See Randall D. Cebul et al.,
Organizational Fragmentation and Care Quality in the U.S. Healthcare System, 22(4) J.
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 93 (2008), available at http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=
10.1257/jep.22.4.93.
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organization” is really a legal network, with certain members and
entities entitled to receive payments in exchange for cutting costs or
improving quality.
In an ACO, an “extended hospital medical staff” (or “a hospitalassociated multi-specialty group practice”) can join forces with a
hospital and agree to be compensated via a lump sum payment. If
the group manages to keep overall costs beneath the lump sum
payment, it can share the gains among its members. Each part of the
team also has an incentive to work together to keep those they care
for healthy. In an ideal world, the ACO responds to concerns about
13
fragmentation raised by several health law experts.
For ACO proponents, virtual networks of physicians and
hospitals may provide efficiency and quality gains. However, there
are many skeptics. Jeff Goldsmith worries about shadowy new
pressures on providers that patients won’t be aware of:
Consumers would not be aware that they were being treated
by ACOs. Rather, they would be “attributed” to them:
virtual patients of virtual organizations. Aggregate health
spending for attributed patients would be tracked, and
increases in that spending would be capped using a form of
“shadow capitation.” ACOs that lived within the caps would
get their fees increased. Those that overspent would see
14
their fees reduced or frozen.
Robert Pear has reported that a “frenzy of mergers involving
hospitals, clinics and doctor groups eager to share costs and savings”
15
worries consumer advocates and antitrust scholars. “The new law is
already encouraging a wave of mergers, joint ventures and alliances
in the health care industry,” according to Prof. Thomas L. Greaney,
an expert on health and antitrust law who spoke at Seton Hall’s ACO
16
Conference. As Greaney puts it, “[t]he risk that dominant providers
13

See the essays in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND
SOLUTIONS (Einer Elhauge, ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2010).
14
Jeff Goldsmith, The Accountable Care Organization: Not Ready for Prime Time,
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 17, 2009), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2009/08/17
/the-accountable-care-organization-not-ready-for-prime-time/.
15
Pear, supra note 9 (“In an environment where health care providers are
financially rewarded for keeping costs down,” [a lawyer for the Consortium for
Citizens with Disabilities] said, “anyone who has a disability or a chronic condition,
anyone who requires specialized or complex care, needs to worry about getting
access to appropriate technology, medical devices and rehabilitation. You don’t want
to save money on the backs of people with disabilities and chronic conditions.”).
16
Thomas Greaney, Accountable Care Organizations: A New New Thing with Some Old
LAW
OUTLOOK
6
(2010),
available
at
Problems,
10
HEALTH
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1679492; Thomas Greaney,
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and dominant insurers may exercise their market power, individually
17
or jointly, has never been greater.”
ACOs also implicate fraud and abuse laws, since anti-kickback
and other prohibitions can hamstring efforts to create relevant
financial incentives. At a recent government workshop on ACOs,
participants addressed “circumstances under which collaboration
among independent health care providers in an ACO permits ACO
providers to engage in joint price negotiations with private payers
without running the risk of engaging in illegal price fixing under the
18
antitrust laws.” HHS also explored “the different ways in which the
Secretary may exercise waiver authority or create new exceptions and
safe-harbors related to the physician self-referral law, the Antikickback statute and the CMP law in order to encourage the creation
19
and development of ACOs.”
The American Medical Association
(AMA) has pushed for “explicit exceptions to the antitrust laws” for
20
participating doctors. The president of the Federation of American
Hospitals says “the fraud and abuse laws should be waived
21
altogether.”
Some scholars may share that skeptical view of fraud and abuse
laws, at least as they pertain to the types of economic transactions

The Affordable Care Act and Competition Policy: Antidote or Placebo?, 89 OR. L. REV. 811
(2011). See also Cory Capps, PhD & David Dranove, PhD, Market Concentration of
Hospitals
(June
2011),
available
at
http://www.ahipcoverage.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/06/ACOs-Cory-Capps-Hospital-Market-ConsolidationFinal.pdf.
17
Greaney quoted in Pear, supra note 9. It is hard to read Greaney’s work on
the topic without concluding that a toxic mix of “doctrinal shortcomings, political
pressures, and institutional constraints” have severely compromised antitrust
enforcement already. Greaney’s 2004 article on antitrust in health care, Chicago’s
Procrustean Bed, also suggests that health care antitrust has, for years, been biased
“strongly [in] favor of defendants” due to the persistent failures of Chicago-inspired
doctrine to reflect “market imperfections” in health care. There have been some
recent wins for federal enforcers against certain major mergers, but the overall
record of the past two decades has been one of consolidation. See, e.g., Joe White,
Markets and Medical Care: The United States, 1993–2005, 85(3) MILLBANK QUARTERLY
143 (2007) (“Hospital managers consolidated systems in order to strengthen their
bargaining power with insurers, and studies show that consolidation did indeed
enable hospitals to extract higher-than-average price increases.”).
18
Agenda, Workshop Regarding Accountable Care Organizations, and Implications
Regarding Antitrust, Physician Self-Referral, Anti-Kickback, and Civil Monetary Penalty
(CMP) Laws, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Oct. 5, 2010), available at
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment
/PhysicianFeeSched/downloads/100510_Meeting_Agenda.pdf
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Pear, supra note 9.
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necessary to make ACOs work. Over the past twenty years, regulation
of fraud and abuse has waxed and waned. In 1996, James F.
Blumstein concluded that “the modern American healthcare industry
is akin to a speakeasy—conduct that is illegal is rampant and
countenanced by law enforcement officials because the law is so out
of sync with the conventional norms and realities of the
22
marketplace.” Nevertheless, as Joan Krause has shown, there are
23
It is therefore
important public purposes behind these laws.
troubling to see a hospital leader advocate for them to be swept away
tout court in the case of ACOs. Policymakers should also be cautious
about granting overly broad antitrust exemptions to ACOs in a field
where competition law’s prerogatives have already been whittled
24
away.
Legal scholar Kevin Werbach once observed that the Internet
25
has been centripetal, “pull[ing] itself together as a coherent whole.”
For Werbach, network formation theory both explains these
centripetal tendencies, and some of “the pressures threatening to
26
pull the Internet apart” into balkanized units. Werbach counsels
that governments need to “catalyz[e] network formation, and
moderat[e] the forces that push towards excessive concentration of
27
power.” These recommendations should also govern new efforts to
create “virtual networks” of care in the wake of the ACA. Like many
forms of network power, the ACOs could quickly have negative
unintended consequences if regulators fail to anticipate the ways they

22

Jonathan Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving Healthcare
Marketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 205, 207 (1996). Gray
areas in the law remain a problem; see, e.g., Jean M. Mitchell, The Prevalence of
Physician Self-Referral Arrangements After Stark II, 26(3) HEALTH AFF. W415 (April 2007).
23
Joan H. Krause, Regulating, Guiding, and Enforcing Health Care Fraud, 60 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 240 (2004).
24
Fact Check: Provider Consolidation Drives Up Prices, AMERICA’S HEALTH INSURANCE
PLAN COVERAGE (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.ahipcoverage.com/2012/02/17/factcheck-provider-consolidation-drives-up-prices/. An alternative is to start regulating
dominant ACOs as veritable health care utilities, as critical to regional infrastructure
as roads, electricity, or water. See Frank Pasquale, The Limits of Competition,
CONCURRING
OPINIONS
(Oct.
26,
2009),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/10/the-limits-of-competitionand-the-rebirth-of-the-public-option.html.
The logic of concentration seems
inevitable in the field: insurers and providers have long been in an arms race for
bargaining power, and as soon as one side gets permission to merge or acquire, the
other clamors for it.
25
Kevin D. Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself Together,
and the Forces Tearing it Apart, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343, 343 (2009).
26
Id. at 345.
27
Id. at 346.
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could be abused. ACOs may work, but only if policymakers can
replace classic instruments of health care regulation with calibrated
financing decisions that reflect new industry realities.
III. SITUATING ACOS: COOPTATION, CAPITULATION, OR COOPERATION
BY DOMINANT PROVIDERS?
The history of American health care is littered with cost
reduction ideas that ran into the buzz saw of quality concerns,
29
provider resistance, or patient rebellion. While capitation promised
to incentivize cost discipline, the many health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) charged with implementing the concept faced
a backlash in the 1990s as they attempted to implement aggressive
30
utilization review. More recently, the less controversial ideas behind
31
gainsharing ran into a number of legal obstacles.
The ACA has emphasized ACOs as both a more and less
ambitious form of cost cutting. Implemented as part of a Medicare
32
Shared Savings Program, ACOs are networks of providers and/or

28

See Frank Pasquale, Network Power: Forced and Free, CONCURRING OPINIONS (May
27, 2008), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/05/network_power_
f.html; Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic
Intelligence Apparatus, 62 Hastings L. J. 1441, 1453–54 (observing mechanisms for the
abuse of networks).
29
GREGG BLOCHE, THE HIPPOCRATIC MYTH (2010); Frank Pasquale, The
Hippocratic Math: How Much Should Society Spend on Health Care?, 32(4) JOURNAL OF
LEGAL MEDICINE 529 (2012) (reviewing GREGG BLOCHE, THE HIPPOCRATIC MYTH
(2010)) (critiquing some cost reduction efforts).
30
Thomas H. Greaney, Managed Care: From Hero to Goat, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
217, 217. (2003); Joe White, Markets and Medical Care: The United States, 1993–2005,
85(3) MILBANK QUARTERLY (2007) (“Utilization reductions were part of the reason
that cost increases slowed in the mid-1990s. Group/staff HMOs certainly did reduce
hospitalization rates. Moreover, health insurers did retreat from many of the
methods of utilization controls that they had emphasized in the mid-1990s.”)
(internal citations omitted).
31
Gainsharing is a financial arrangement that permits physicians to share in the
savings that result when they alter practice patterns. Richard S. Saver, Squandering the
Gain: Gainsharing and the Continuing Dilemma of Physician Financial Incentives, 98 NW.
U. L. REV. 145, 147 (2003). For example, a group of surgeons may engage in bulk
purchasing to obtain discounts on surgical equipment, rather than each choosing
instruments individually. Start-ups like Groupon and Living Social have exploited
this savings model, but residual quality concerns have impeded its adoption in health
care settings. Some recent pilot programs have indicated the potential for savings
from gainsharing. Mike Kalison, Presentation at the Seton Hall Law Review
Symposium on ACOs (Oct. 28, 2011).
32
PPACA § 3022(a)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 395, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1).
The term ACO originated in a 2006 exchange. Elliott S. Fisher et al., Creating
Accountable Care Organizations: The Extended Hospital Medical Staff, 26(1) HEALTH AFF.
w44 (2007), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/26/1
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33

hospital(s) that are charged with coordinating care for a group of at
34
As of early 2012, HHS had
least 5,000 Medicare beneficiaries.
already named thirty-two “health care organizations and providers
that are already experienced in coordinating care for patients across
35
care settings” as pioneer ACOs. ACOs can be physician-centered,
36
CMS will
hospital-centered, or some combination of the two.
reward the provision of quality care by giving providers participating
in the ACO a share of the savings if risk-adjusted, per-beneficiary
spending levels came in below a benchmark set by the agency at the
outset. For example, if benchmark spend were $10,000 apiece for
10,000 beneficiaries in 2014, and the ACO reduced the spend to
/w44.full. It is designed to solve a classic “chicken and egg” problem in health care
reform: whether to start with payment or delivery system reform. See Kelly Devers &
Robert Berenson, Can Accountable Care Organizations Improve the Value of Health Care by
Solving the Cost and Quality Quandaries?, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. (Oct. 2009),
available at http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/acobrieffinal.pdf, in which the
authors state that:
Many believe that to bend the cost curve while improving quality, we
must reform the provider payment system first, because it pays for
volume rather than value. Others hold that it is impossible to change
the payment system to achieve the desired objectives unless delivery
system reform first produces organizations capable of handling an
altered payment system. They point to the need for health care
professionals, now usually working in separate institutional settings, to
work collaboratively and to demonstrate their capacity for handling
new payment approaches. To avoid the quandary of where to start
first—provider payment or delivery system reform—the ACO concept
attempts to combine them.
Id.
33
Bruce Merlin Fried et al., Accountable Care Organizations: Navigating the Legal
Landscape of Shared Savings and Coordinated Care, 4 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 88 (2010)
(“A wide range of professionals may work together to establish ACOs, including
physicians in group practice arrangements, networks of individual physician
practices, hospitals, and partnerships or joint ventures between hospitals and
physician groups. ACOs also may include other forms of groups as the HHS
Secretary (Secretary) deems appropriate. By forming an ACO, these healthcare
providers commit to being held accountable for the quality, cost, and overall care of
Medicare beneficiaries.”).
34
Francis J. Crosson, The Accountable Care Organization: Whatever Its Growing Pains,
The Concept Is Too Vitally Important To Fail, 30(7) HEALTH AFF. 1250 (2011), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/30/7/1250.full. ACOs have also been
called “amorphous cluster[s] of possible collaborative models,” where hospitals are
bound to remain central because “the largest avoidable Medicare costs are hospital
related” and “in many communities, the hospital is the only organized care delivery
entity capable of executing the model.” Id.
35
Pioneer ACO Model, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
http://innovations.cms.gov/initiatives/aco/pioneer/ (last visited July 12, 2012).
36
Physician-centered ACOs could include multispecialty group practices (MSGs)
and interdependent physician organizations (IPOs), also known as independent
practice associations (IPAs).
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$9,000 while maintaining quality levels, $10 million in savings could
be attained, some of which would compensate participants in the
ACO.
Some may question why ACOs were included in the ACA when
more direct cost savings (such as direct discouragement of marginally
effective treatments, or reduced reimbursement levels) are also part
of the Act. Part of the answer lies in growing Democratic party
consensus about government partnering with corporate entities to
achieve public ends. There is still a residual divide between “realists”
in the Democratic party and more idealistic progressives; as Ed
Kilgore states, “on a widening range of issues, Obama’s critics to the
right say he’s engineering a government takeover of the private
sector, while his critics to the left accuse him of promoting a
37
corporate takeover of the public sector.”
But by and large, the
realists guided the ACA’s drafting. Opposition to the public option
became so intense in official Washington (especially among the
insurance industry-friendly staffers of Senate Finance Chair Max
Baucus) that those pursuing universal coverage have become
identified with the very entities they were trying to discipline via
38
health insurance exchanges and delivery system reforms.
Some political commentators rejected the compromises that
resulted. Glenn Greenwald offered a multifaceted indictment of
Congressional Democrats’ bargains with corporate interests:
The health care bill is one of the most flagrant
advancements of . . . corporatism yet, as it bizarrely forces
millions of people to buy extremely inadequate products
from the private health insurance industry—regardless of
whether they want it or, worse, whether they can afford it
(even with some subsidies). . . . It’s about affirmatively
harnessing government power in order to benefit and
strengthen those corporate interests and even merging
39
government and the private sector.
Only the full implementation of PPACA will allow us to judge
how serious Greenwald’s concerns are. Rulemaking on essential
37

Ed Kilgore, Left-Right Convergence?, DEMOCRATIC STRATEGIST (Dec. 16, 2009),
http://www.thedemocraticstrategist.org/strategist/2009/12/leftright_convergence
.php.
38
For background on the public option, see Frank Pasquale, Public Option as
Private
Benchmark,
CONCURRING
OPINIONS
(June
9,
2009),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/06/public-option-as-privatebenchmark.html.
39
Glenn Greenwald, The Underlying Divisions in the Healthcare Debate, SALON (Dec.
18, 2009), http://www.salon.com/2009/12/18/corporatism/.
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health benefits promises to make most insurance products available
on exchanges adequate. However, medical loss ratio waivers granted
40
to some carriers threaten to hamper the ACA’s effect. Moreover,
affordability is a major concern, especially since the Treasury
Department ruled that the 9.5%-of-income limit on the costs of
insurance for those making under 400% of the Federal Poverty Line
only applies to the cost of a plan for an individual worker, and not for
41
his or her family.
These developments ensure that a harsh spotlight will be cast on
ACOs. Will they successfully meld the best of public values and
private initiative? Or will they recapitulate the crony capitalism so
often identified in the defense and banking sectors? Often, the very
interest groups that are supposed to be reined in by pilot programs
do their best to alter, influence, or limit those programs. One need
only look at the convoluted history of gainsharing pilot programs to
get a sense of how, as the “rubber hits the road,” various lobbies will
42
be storming veto points to undermine experimentalists’ efforts.
This is not to say that pilot programs are a sham—I’ve published a
book chapter on pilot programs as information-forcing regulatory
design, and Mike Kalison’s presentation at the Seton Hall ACO
Conference demonstrated some very promising results from
gainsharing studies that finally got off the ground. I just want to
temper the technocratic optimism at the heart of progressive
enthusiasm for the ACA in general, and ACOs in particular.
Like 2009’s stabilizations of the financial system, the ACA may be
a Pyrrhic victory for the Democratic Party. As one strategist put it: “In
their determination to avoid Harry and Louise, they’ve become
40

For loopholes, see Frank Pasquale, Consumer Watchdog on Health Reform
OPINIONS
(Apr.
8,
2010),
Loopholes,
CONCURRING
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/04/consumer-watchdog-onhealth-reform-loopholes.html.
41
Judy Solomon, Health Care Coverage Must be Affordable for Families, Too, CTR. FOR
BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (July 27, 2012), http://www.offthechartsblog.org
/health-coverage-must-be-affordable-for-families-too/
(“Treasury’s
current
interpretation of the ACA . . . considers employer coverage affordable for the entire
family as long as coverage just for the employee costs no more than 9.5 percent of
the family’s income. Unfortunately, on average, employer-sponsored health plans
charge employees more than twice as much for family coverage as individual
coverage. Thus, many workers wouldn’t qualify for help buying coverage for their
family even though the cost of employer-provided family coverage far exceeded the
ACA’s 9.5 percent affordability threshold.”). Marco Ferreira has written an
expanded version of this critique. Ferreira, Affordability After the ACA, manuscript on
file with author (2012).
42
See Hearing on Gainsharing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong.
(2005).
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Thelma & Louise.” Although it was a characteristically snide and
smug observation from inside the Beltway, this bon mot has some
chance of coming true. Like most of the conventional wisdom
excrudescing from pundits, it’s less a reflection of reality than a
narrative our entrenched political class enacts. The “politics of
reform” will be endlessly refracted in D.C. media celebrities’ halls of
mirrors, where a twenty-four-hour news cycle is always hungry for
“backlash.” The lazy conventional wisdom has already coalesced
around a narrative of Obama-as-Icarus, perpetually mistaking his
cautious incrementalism as creeping socialism.
In the culmination of a decades-long struggle for the soul of the
Democratic party, realists routed idealists during the ACA legislative
process. They pushed the public option off the table, assuring that
public-private partnerships like ACOs and insurance exchanges
would be the ACA’s primary mechanisms for delivering access to
care.
The sclerotic Senate’s supermajority rules and the
Congressional Budget Office’s rigid analyses put the realists in the
driver’s seat, and idealistic progressives were left with little more than
44
the power to refuse the bill that Senate centrists crafted.
By passing the ACA’s technocratic and business-centered
solutions, Democrats jettisoned populism for an early-twentiethcentury progressive vision of technocratic alliances between
45
corporate and government experts. As HHS implements the ACA,
we are commencing an endless argument (read: notice and comment
rulemaking and subsequent administrative adjudications) over what
constitutes an adequate baseline of coverage, what is the fair share of
revenue for middlemen like insurers, and what regulatory
infrastructure can best vindicate the entitlements (and impose the
burdens) specified by the bill. But the fundamental victory of
reform—the national commitment that no one should have to
choose between death or bankruptcy when confronted with a serious
illness—will also endure. That commitment will only prove effective,

43

That’s the verdict on the Obama Administration from a Democratic strategist
tweeted by horserace reporter extraordinaire, Chris Cillizza, referencing a 90s-era ad
campaign against the Clinton plan for health reform and a film starring two
exuberant yet ultimately self-destructive protagonists.
44
See Frank Pasquale, Politicized Prognostication at the Congressional Budget Office,
OPINIONS
(July
28,
2009),
CONCURRING
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/07/politicized-prognosticationat-the-congressional-budget-office.html.
45
For a discussion of the place of populism and progressivism in American law,
see J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE L.J. 1935
(1995).
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though, if reforms like ACOs manage to improve quality and access.
IV. SYMPOSIUM VIEWPOINTS ON THE FUTURE OF ACOS
ACOs can take a variety of organizational forms, such as
integrated delivery systems, primary care or multispecialty medical
groups, hospital-based systems, and contractual or virtual networks of
physicians such as independent practice associations. Some
policymakers worry that shared saving may not adequately motivate
providers to change long-established customary practices, however
lacking the evidence base may be for those practices. One of our
Symposium contributors, Jessica L. Mantel, complements that worry
by offering nuanced perspectives based on health services research
on the interactions between the delivery system and the payment
system.
Mantel’s compelling article, Accountable Care Organizations: Can
We Have Our Cake and Eat It Too?, sounds a judicious note of caution
about delivery system innovation. While ACO proponents have
offered many excellent ideas for improved health care at lower cost,
there have been many other historical efforts to trim “fat” and
improve the treatment of chronic conditions. ACOs’ political appeal
may well spell their undoing as a vector of cost containment.
Washington “wise men” have long insisted that so much health
care spending is wasteful, making it possible to cover many more
individuals and improve quality by cutting out unnecessary care and
46
using the savings to purchase productive medical interventions.
47
Indeed, some estimates say that a third of care is wasted. However,
consider what was long said of the advertising industry: half of
marketing budgets are wasted, the only problem is that we don’t
know which half. That may be far less true in an age of targeted
Google AdWords, but no one has yet succeeded in developing the
Google of health care.
Mantel takes the humbling logic of
advertising’s black box to healthcare policy, adducing numerous
pieces of evidence to demonstrate that it is sometimes very difficult to
disincentivize unnecessary care without also discouraging needed
interventions.
Mantel also reviews the health policy literature to demonstrate
that the potential cost-savings from better management of patients
46

Ezra Klein, The Number-Cruncher-in-Chief, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 11, 2008, available
at http://prospect.org/article/number-cruncher-chief.
47
See Rich McManus, Perhaps One-Third of Health Care Spending is Wasted, Says
RECORD,
Apr.
17,
2009,
available
at
Brownlee,
NIH
http://nihrecord.od.nih.gov/newsletters/2009/04_17_2009/story2.htm.
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with chronic conditions may be lower than ACO proponents
48
contend. She also doubts that ACOs can do much about long-term
inflationary pressures from advances in medical technology.
Avoiding expensive technology without sacrificing quality will prove
difficult in at least some cases.
Mantel expertly integrates insights from diverse literatures into
her contribution to the symposium. Her work raises larger questions
for law professors engaging with policy science literatures. How do
we assess the validity, replicability, and extrapolability of results? How
robust are predictive models? During the debate on health care
reform, several experts challenged the Congressional Budget Office’s
49
estimates of the overall costs arising out of House and Senate bills.
They stated that the CBO’s work was particularly dubious because it
did not fully take into account the efficiency gains that could arise
out of synergistically reinforcing delivery system reforms. Mantel’s
work gives us some reason to respect CBO’s caution about projecting
cost savings, however troubling may be the CBO’s neglect of many
important social values in its calculations.
Given the extraordinary difficulty of validating long-term cost
projections, scholars might want to explore other paths forward. The
effort will need to begin with humility about the limits and scope of
quantitative predictions. For example, George Mason economist
Russ Roberts has critiqued problems of reliability and replicability in
social science research in a series of well-regarded interviews with
50
leaders in the economics and finance fields. In econometrics, Ed
51
Leamer has complained for years about problematic analyses. Brian
Nosek has worried that social scientific practices depart so far from
ideals of science that he is co-authoring a series of articles on
“scientific utopias” to build support for entirely new modes of open

48

According to Mantel, studies of both preventative measures and disease
management programs have repeatedly found that most fail to produce net costsavings, and in some cases, the programs even increase health care spending. Jessica
Mantel, Accountable Care Organizations: Can We Have Our Cake and Eat It Too?, 42
SETON HALL. L. REV. 1393, 1405 (2012).
49
Michael Ricciardelli, CBO Wrong on Cost Numbers, HEALTH REFORM WATCH
(Aug. 30, 2009), http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2009/08/30/cbo-wrong-onhealth-care-reform-cost-numbers/.
50
See Roberts’s interviews with Ed Leamer, Nicholas Nassim Taleb, and Brian
Nosek, available at LIBRARY OF ECONMICS AND LIBERTY, http://www.econtalk.org/ (last
visited Oct. 10, 2012).
51
Ed Leamer, Let’s Take the ‘Con’ Out of Econometrics, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 31
(1983), available at http://www.international.ucla.edu/media/files/Leamer_article
.pdf.
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52

research. Finally, Victoria Stodden has led an effort toward open
science that would empower those who rely upon research to review
the underlying analyses it is based on, and to draw their own
53
conclusions.
Of course, even if all of these critiques and positive projects
succeed in better illuminating the data underlying health policy
analyses and projections, cost benefit analysis may still fail to grasp
the complex dynamics of health care cost and quality trends. We
might expect physicians to engage in various forms of income
maintenance, whatever plans HHS or state agencies devise. Squeeze
the health care cost “balloon” on one side, and it may only bulge out
54
somewhere else.
Given the limits of quantitative projection, we
need to see more openness to qualitative analysis in the health policy
arena.
One promising alternative is “scenario planning,” now common
in the environmental arena and catching on in business. Scenario
planners imagine how a variety of economic, cultural, political, and
other developments may interact. As Rob Verchick explains, a more
comprehensive approach may be the only way to do justice to the
interactions and unexpected consequences inevitable in a complex
economy:
Cost-benefit approaches provide poor measures when they
depend on forecasting too many long-term and uncertain
costs. . . . [S]cenario planning broadens knowledge by
taking a holistic approach to describing circumstances. . . .
The strong emphasis on narrative allows the technique to

52

Brian A. Nosek & Yoav Bar-Anan, Scientific Utopia: I. Opening Scientific
Communication (May 5, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2051047.
53
Stodden et al., Reproducible Research, 12 (5) COMPUTING SCIENCE AND
ENGINEERING, 8–13 (September/October 2010, doi: 10.1109/MCSE.2010.113.).
54
See, e.g., Charles Morris’s statement that:
There is a strongly held opinion, particularly among conservative think
tanks, that with multiple competitive private payers, the normal
interactions between vendors and payers will gradually create a more
efficient health care system. I saw no evidence to support that belief.
What actually happens [at the hospital division he observed was that]
the billing staff sit down each year; lay out the various payment plans
on a spreadsheet, and decide on the division strategy—which surgeons
will join which plans, and which carriers will be carried on a nonplan
basis, trading higher payments for greater collection risk. Once that
strategy is set, it is managed entirely by the collections staff. The
surgeons simply join the plans they’re assigned to.
CHARLES MORRIS, THE SURGEONS 236 (2007).
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capture a problem in its full complexity.
Roger Boesche’s essay, Why Could Tocqueville Predict So
Well?, describes a similar capability in the great French social theorist.
As Boesche relates, in Tocqueville’s works, “society is an ‘ensemble’ in
which the elements are ‘indissolubly united:’”
[T]he second volume of Democracy in America endeavors to
demonstrate how language, literature, the relations of
masters and servants, the status of women, the family,
property, politics, and so forth, must change and align
themselves in a new, symbiotic configuration as a result of
56
the historical thrust toward equality.
Tocqueville’s work focused on the chain reactions of social
change that occurred as social equality spread. In our own time, we
need to use similar methods to describe the consequences of a
historical thrust toward inequality, particularly with respect to the
health care system. How might declining income shares for the
middle and lower classes, and increasing shares for the very wealthy,
affect providers’ goals and incentives? As the very top of the income
scale pulls away from health professionals making, say, $140,000 to
$800,000 annually, how might these professionals respond to policy
57
initiatives that further cut their share of income?
For example, one might expect that a consolidation of facilities
might leave the large players still standing with an opportunity to
demand more compensation once they are dominant in a given
health care marketplace. In her expert analysis of the interaction of
competition law and ACOs, Tara Ragone tries to assure that proper
antitrust enforcement against health care titans prevents abusive
practices, while not inadvertently discouraging innovative service
provision for providers focused on at-risk populations. Her article,
Structuring Medicaid Accountable Care Organizations to Avoid Antitrust
Challenges, focuses on concerns that New Jersey’s Medicaid ACO pilot
program may trigger federal antitrust concerns. It will prove useful
to advisors in any state interested in developing new care models for
their Medicaid populations.
There are aspects of the New Jersey Medicaid ACO
collaborations that some competition law experts may find troubling.

55

ROBERT VERCHICK, FACING CATASTROPHE 242 (Harvard Univ. Press, 2010).
Roger Boesche, Why Could Tocqueville Predict So Well?, 11 POLITICAL THEORY 79
(1983).
57
For figures on the relative income gains of the top 1, 0.1, 0.01, and 0.001%, see
Frank Pasquale, Access to Medicine in an Era of Fractal Inequality, 19 ANNALS OF HEALTH
L. 269, 276 (2010).
56
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For example, only one Medicaid ACO is permitted in each defined
region, and the ACO must have the support of all the hospitals and at
least seventy-five percent of the primary care providers in that region.
New Jersey believes that such stringent requirements are necessary to
guarantee “clinical integration,” a sine qua non for the price
improvement and cost cutting that ought to be at the core of
consumer-oriented antitrust analysis. “Rule of reason” review for New
Jersey’s
pilot
Medicaid
Accountable
Care
Organization
58
Demonstration Project (“pilot”) seems an appropriately “light
59
touch” antitrust doctrine to apply.
Sound principles of antitrust law support such a move, since the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ)
have recognized the potential for clinical integration to boost quality.
Given the clear legislative intent of the pilot to encourage clinical
integration in the name of quality improvement at reduced costs, it
seems likely that the DOJ and FTC will find that the procompetitive
advantages to consumers of New Jersey’s pilot outweigh its potential
harm to competition, and that the anticompetitive aspects of the
60
collaboration are necessary to realize its benefits. All in all, it would
be a shame to see antitrust law, reduced to a nearly vestigial role in
many purely profit-maximizing industries, scuttle innovation among
health care providers who are participating in community-oriented
initiatives.
Scenario planning for policy innovation will depend on close
attention to the “facts on the ground” in different states’ health care
markets. Barbara J. Zabawa, Louise G. Trubek & Felice F. BorisyRudin’s article, Adopting Accountable Care Through the Medicare
Framework, further confirms the importance of an empirical
approach. Zabawa et al. argue that the thought leaders behind ACOs

58

New Jersey’s Medicaid ACO demonstration project is a three-year pilot to test
multi-stakeholder, geographic-based Medicaid ACOs.
59
See Tara Ragone, Structuring Medicaid Accountable Care Organizations to Avoid
Antitrust Challenges, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1443 (2012). Antitrust concerns stem
from the fact that the pilot increases regional coordination and shared
accountability, which can lead to less competition (integration encourages fewer
competitors in the markets, which could increase market power). Even where prices
are set by the government (Medicare) or effectively capped by government payments
to HMOs (much of Medicaid), and not subject to being heavily influenced by
anticompetitive collusion, regulators may worry about non-price elements of
competition (such as output, quality of services, and innovation).
60
According to Ragone, the state has articulated a policy to allow the
anticompetitive conduct to ensure that the State’s goals, and not simply self-serving
goals, are furthered, and has suggested a commitment to provide active supervision
here. Ragone, supra note 59, at 1462.

PASQUALE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

10/22/2012 11:02 AM

1388

[Vol. 42:1371

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

were cognizant of past failures when designing the Medicare Shared
Saving Program, addressing the issues raised by such resistance
movements as the “managed care backlash.” Zabawa et al. note that
New Jersey consists of mainly small practices, but despite this
fragmentation, it witnessed precursors of ACOs. These included
collaboratives to improve patient safety in the ICU, and a three-year
gain-sharing pilot project funded by CMS in 2009.
A multi-tiered governmental guidance and management
structure will be necessary to achieve the triple aim of “better health,
better care, and reduced costs” via ACOs, along with meaningful
patient engagement. Zabawa et al.’s story of Wisconsin accountable
care is richly layered, drawing on the authors’ decades of experience
practicing and teaching health law there. They attest that Wisconsin
has a “rich culture of collaboration” with “prominen[t] integrated
delivery systems,” and report that many health systems there believe
that they already provide accountable care. Their account of the
Wisconsin Collaborative for Health Care Quality also has important
lessons for those who will be discussing and implementing ACOs in
61
the future.
Zabawa et al. believe that accountable care reformers have
62
learned from managed care’s difficulties in the 1990s, as especially
evidenced in the concessions made between the proposed and final
63
rules on the MSSP. They believe that ACOs are building upon the
success of pilot programs in Wisconsin and New Jersey, and will
provide effective patient engagement. Zabawa et al. therefore
provide targeted, localized evidence that states like New Jersey and
Wisconsin may be able to overcome the considerable hurdles to
clinical integration and cost control noted in Mantel’s work.
The process of clinical integration is not only happening at the
macro-level with ACOs, but is also moving forward on the micro-level,
in Patient Centered Medical Homes (PCMHs). Sallie Thieme
61

“Each system has strong affiliations or partnerships with at least one hospital;
all have its own employed physician groups, which includes both primary care and
specialist; all but two have its own health plan as part of its system; and each has an
EMR that the system has been using for many years.” Zabawa et al., Adopting
Accountable Care Through the Medicare Framework, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1471, 1479
(2012).
62
For example, freedom to leave an ACO coupled with the prohibition against
referrals and financial incentives to entice beneficiaries to remain in the ACO is
arguably a response to the managed care backlash.
63
The MSSP encourages or mandates the use of shared governance, information
technology, multi-professional practitioners, financial incentives, benchmarks,
metrics and patient participation; it required population-based accountability,
coordinated care, quality health care, and efficiency.
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Sanford’s insightful article, Designing Model Homes for the Changing
Medical Neighborhood: A Multi-Payer Pilot Offers Lessons for ACO and
PCMH Construction, takes the construction metaphor for health care
seriously, and illuminates several important lessons that should guide
policymakers going forward. Sanford explains that the PCMH is a
64
primary care initiative “not far removed in principle” from the ACO
model; indeed, in some formulations the PCMH is a necessary part of
any well-functioning ACO. Sanford reminds us that zoning laws exert
a powerful influence on the residential and business activity, often in
unseen ways. So too can payment systems and regulatory approaches
influence doctors, patients, and hospitals’ actions, and can motivate
65
entirely new forms of care delivery. Sanford’s article considers how
these redesigned “medical homes” could fit into the rezoned “high66
performing medical neighborhoods” envisioned by Fisher and
others.
As Sanford observes, managed care cut the rate of the health
care cost growth dramatically, but provoked a backlash when some
members felt trapped in closed networks of providers. New programs
need to be sensitive to these concerns and to build up trust among
members and providers. Sanford’s article explains the Washington
Multi-Payer Medical Home Reimbursement Pilot, a multi-payer
model which includes additional upfront payments, potential shared
savings, downside financial risk, and other elements reflective of
“accountable care.” This pilot involves most of the state’s major
insurers in a thirty-two-month project to provide upfront payments
for enhanced primary care in selected practices. These practices will
also see shared saving if there are reductions in ER visits or
hospitalizations beyond set targets.
There are some encouraging models here. Washington’s Group
Health Cooperative piloted a medical home demo in 2006. As
Sanford explains, this project developed patient engagement through
electronic health records. It also promoted care plans for the

64

BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 185 (West, 6th ed. Supp. 2011).
See also Frank Pasquale, The Three Faces of Retainer Care, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y
L. & ETHICS 39, 56 (2007) (discussing how interpretations of Medicare and state
insurance regulations could affect concierge medicine); Frank Pasquale, Ending the
Specialty Hospital Wars: A Plea for Pilot Programs as Information-Forcing Regulatory
Design, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS
235 (Einer Elhauge, ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 2010) (discussing the rise of ambulatory
surgical centers and specialty hospitals in the context of larger changes in the health
care industry).
66
Elliott S. Fisher, Building a Medical Neighborhood for the Medical Home, 359 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1202, 1205 (2008).
65
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chronically ill, more comprehensive physician visits, routine careterm “huddles” to review patient needs, and greater involvement by
nurses, pharmacists, medical assistants (and other physician
extenders) in coordinating patient care. Additional costs were
recouped by significant reduction in ER visits and hospitalizations.
Also in Washington, the Boeing Intensive Outpatient Care Program
helped align the incentives of a major self-insured airplane
manufacturer with employees and providers.
Employees were
matched with a team of providers who offered health services in a
medical home model in exchange for their usual fees plus care
management fees. The extra fees were a wise investment: the overall
costs for those employees were twenty percent less than a control
group.
The Boeing project and others like it suggest that PCMH models
function best with upfront funding. Upfront funding is a feature of
Washington’s multi-payer, multi-site pilot whichlaunched in May
2011. Practice sites in the pilot receive not only their usual fee-forservice payments, but also a monthly care management fee (CMF).
This should allow infrastructural investment in care coordination
(including technology to advance telemedical practice, emails, and
team meetings) and electronic health records. Seven health plans
and eight primary care practices have signed on. If quality metrics
are maintained and ER visits and hospitalizations are reduced below
break-even targets, the practice sites share the financial savings with
the insurers; if the targets are not met, the practice sites face
downside financial risk, including a reduced CMF. This pilot is
intended to support a broader transformation of the healthcare
system towards, and Sanford’s article considers the lessons it offers
for accountable care in general and the PCMH in particular.
Sanford’s careful research demonstrates that Patient-Centered
Medical Homes and Accountable Care Organizations may develop
synergistically, if the right legal, policy, and training frameworks are
in place.
Overall, the four articles present invaluable research on the past
and future of accountable care policy initiatives to achieve the “triple
aim” of reducing costs, increasing quality, and enhancing access.
Mantel and Ragone offer wake up calls about the policy and legal
risks of ACOs. It’s impossible to read their articles and to come away
with a sense that the road ahead for accountable care will be easy.
On the other hand, Zabawa et al. and Sanford have demonstrated
that in some settings in Washington, New Jersey, and Wisconsin,
efforts to coordinate care have saved money without negatively
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impacting patients—and have, on occasion, improved quality as well.
Political, economic, and medical trends will determine whether
skepticism or optimism toward ACO’s was the proper mood as of
2012. Regardless of what they bring, anyone interested in the future
of health policy will be richly rewarded by careful reading of these
articles.
V. CONCLUSION
The U.S. health care system too often puts profits ahead of
67
patients’ interests. Economic incentives must become more finetuned. The ACA in general, and ACOs in particular, are worthy
efforts to offer incentives to improve quality, control costs, and
expand access. Panelists at Seton Hall’s ACO conference offered a
great deal of insight and advice on how best to accomplish those
68
goals.
This volume memorializes notable contributions to this
important public dialogue.

67

Timothy S. Jost, Our Broken Health Care System and How to Fix It: An Essay on
Health Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 537 (2006).
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